Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 12
Issue 1 Winter 1979

Article 2

1980

The Unconstitutional Detention of Mexican and Canadian
Prisoners by the United States Government
Jordan J. Paust

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jordan J. Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Mexican and Canadian Prisoners by the United States
Government, 12 Vanderbilt Law Review 67 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol12/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL DETENTION
OF MEXICAN AND CANADIAN
PRISONERS BY THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT*
Jordan J. Paust**
A recent article by Professor Bassiouni addresses the procedures
for the transfer of prisoners under agreements with Mexico and
Canada and certain "substantive constitutional issues" in a most
interesting way.' Nevertheless an interest in addressing constitutional problems from the most thorough of approaches possible
compels further comment on federal powers and constitutional
rights. Professor Bassiouni's efforts are noteworthy but his stated
conclusion that "[t]he scheme for the transfer of offenders is ' a2
laudable step which should be supported by the bench and bar
should not be unquestioningly accepted. The transfer agreements
represent a retreat from the constitutional protection of fundamental rights and a deplorable attempt to aggrandize federal powers
through transnational agreements.
It is difficult to understand why international and constitutional
lawyers have not actively opposed the agreements. Recent literature has ignored the fundamental constitutional question of
whether a transnational agreement can authorize the continued
incarceration in the United States of individuals who were prosecuted for violations of foreign law in a foreign tribunal using foreign
procedures. It seems inescapable that no agreement with a foreign
government can confer such powers upon the state or federal government.
The United States Supreme Court has stated emphatically that
"no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any branch of government, which is free from the
* Although this publication does not often print reactions to articles, the Editors believe the issues raised by Professor Paust are of singular import to practitioners involved in prisoner transfer.
** Fulbright Professor of Law, University of Salzburg, Austria; on leave, University of Houston.
1. See M. C. Bassiouni, Perspectiveson the Transferof PrisonersBetween the
United States and Mexico and the United States and Canada, 11 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 193 (1978).
2. See id. at 267.
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restraints of the Constitution."' 3 This is especially so since the powers of the federal goverment are "entirely a creature of the Constitution." 4 National sovereignty, including those powers not expressly delegated to the national government, remains in the people of the United States.5 If the federal government has no constitutional power to incarcerate persons under laws and after prosecution by tribunals that were not authorized by Congress, an agreement with a foreign state can grant no such power. Furthermore,
if the federal government has no power to incarcerate persons
under United States laws after prosecution in an appropriate tribunal whenever a conviction results from unconstitutional procedures, it may not incarcerate persons who were convicted by foreign tribunals under procedures that would have been unconstitutional in the United States. Agreements with foreign governments
can add nothing to federal powers that do not exist.
The implementation of such agreements would result in the unconstitutional exercise of control by the federal government over
persons within the United States. The government would be exercising powers that do not exist. Moreover, where the original foreign convictions or foreign post-conviction treatment violated
United States due process standards, and, possibly, fundamental
human rights, the government of the United States would be
exercising control over individuals in a manner that is inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of the fifth amendment.
United States enforcement of foreign convictions involving violations of human rights would have serious transnational implications and could potentially disrupt long-term United States foreign policy and the promotion of fundamental human rights. By
exercising control over such individuals, the federal government
would become a complicitor in a continuous deprivation of fundamental constitutional guarantees and what might amount to an
ongoing violation of fundamental human rights. Such a development must be condemned.
3. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); see also U.S. v. CurtissWright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (Const. and govt. power).
4. See id. at 506, adding: "Its power and authority have no other source."
5. See, e.g., J. Paust, InternationalLaw and Control of the Media: Terror,
Repression and the Alternatives, 53 INDIA L.J. 621, 622 (1978), and authorities

cited.
6. Concerning actions abroad, see, e.g., Reid v. Covert, supra note 3, at 6-9;
Seery v. U.S., 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. C1. 1955); and Bassiouni, supra note 1, at

262.
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Further complications are presented by "waivers" signed by individuals. Even if fundamental constitutional rights can be
waived, 7 it is clear that an individual cannot grant a power to the
federal government that it does not possess. The United States
government is "entirely a creature of the Constitution" and "[i]ts
power and authority have no other source." ' Sovereignty remains
with the people of the United States as a whole, and an individual
can create no power inthe government, even in conjunction with
an agreement with a foreign government and congressional
"implementing" legislation. Federal powers exist, if at all, under
the Constitution. There is an additional question about the legal
significance of the "waiver" of a right to challenge the foreign
conviction Such a waiver cannot annul the right to challenge the
exercise byfederal government of powers that it does not possess.
Such a waiver cannot deprive a prisoner of the right to challenge
the government's violation of constitutional guarantees.
Any challenges raised by prisoners would not be directed against
the foreign conviction as such, but the United States government's
control of individuals in an unconstitutional manner. For these
reasons, at least transferred prisoners cannot waive the use of the
writ of habeas corpus. From the human rights standpoint, it is also
important to note that a violation of fundamental human rights
can be "waived" neither by an individual nor by a government.'
Such are obligations erga omnes.'0 And to the extent that human
rights are also constitutionally protected,' the acceptability of the
prisoner transfer agreements and mechanisms are even more sus7. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supranote 1; and Note, ConstitutionalProblemsin the
Execution of ForeignPenal Sentences: The Mexican-American PrisonerTransfer
Treaty, 90 HARv.L. REV. 1500 (1977).
8. See supra note 4.
9. See J. Paust & A. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdictionand Due Process:
The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 26-27 and 34 (1978);
and J. Paust, Letter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 508 (1977). Professor Bassiouni also notes
without further comment that human rights violations "would invalidate the
waiver." See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 259.
10. See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 9, at 34, and authorities cited.
11. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 5; J. Paust, Does Your Police Force Use Illegal
Weapons? -A ConfigurativeApproach to DecisionIntegratingInternationaland
Domestic Law, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 19 (1977); J. Paust, Human Rights and the
Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 231 (1975).
Concerning human rights to due process of law, see Paust &Blaustein, supranote
9, at 32; and Harvard note, supra note 7, at 1509-10. Whether human rights were
violated would, of course, depend upon the circumstances in each case. A new
federal hearing should be available for such purpose.

page 70, lines 2-3, change "Actions by the federal
courts .do no preclude the act of state doctrine" to
read: "Federal court remedies are not precluded by
the act of state doctrine . . ."
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pect. Further, the remedies open to individuals are generally'enlarged if human rights were violated. 2 Actions by the federal
courts do not preclude the act of state doctrine when the relevant
conduct of a foreign state involves violations of international law.' 3
Professor Bassiouni recognizes that the violation of human rights
law poses a traditional conflict of laws question: whether the public policy of the United States is thwarted by the recognition of a
foreign penal judgment which violates human rights.'4 United
States interests are definitely frustrated,'5 but the problems posed
are much more substantial. United States implementation of such
12. Beyond constitutional protection of human rights in United States courts,
there are possibilities of complaints to the United Nations and the Organization
of American States.
13. See, e.g., J. Paust, Letter, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. (1978), and authorities cited.
The Harvard note failed to address the question in terms of fairly clear violations
of international law and is thus misleading on this point. See supra note 7, at
1520-22. It should also be noted that a federal denial of a United States judicial
remedy for relevant human rights violations would necessarily clash with the
obligation to affirmatively guarantee an "effective remedy" in competent national tribunals that is recognized in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which is itself a significant indicia of the human rights obligations
of the United States that are contained in the United Nations Charter. See, e.g.,
Paust & Blaustein, supra note 9, at 15-16; R. Higgins, Conceptual Thinking
About the Individual in InternationalLaw, 24 N.Y. L. REv. 11, 22 (1978); L. Sohn,
The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEXAs INT'L L.J. 129, 133-34 (1977)
(actually considering the Declaration as now a part of customary law); H. Hansell
(Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State), Address, 1977 PRoc., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 207,
208 (1977) ("authority and guidance"); L. Meeker, Address, 1975 PROC., AM. Soc.
INT'L L. 225 (1975) (defining content); C. Maw, Address, id. at 261; B. Schulter,
The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations
Charter,61 CAL. L. REv. 110 (1973), especially id. at 126 n. 92 (citing authorities);
F. Newman, Interpreting the Human Rights Clauses of the U.N. Charter, 5
HUMAN RIGHTS J. 283 and 285-86 (1972); see also C. Schreuer, The Impact of
InternationalInstitutionson the Protectionof Human Rights in Domestic Courts,
4 ISRAEL YRBK. H.R . 60, 77-88 (1974) (with many useful examples of state court
implementation); G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 79-81 (1974); Preamble, 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 679 (1971); and other authorities cited in Paust & Blaustein, supra. Article. '"
of the American Convention, supra, recognizes the same right to a prompt and
effective remedy.
14. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 262, 264. See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 443 (1972).
15. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1976); see also 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
On United States Supreme Court use of human right norms see, e.g., J. Paust,
Human Dignity as a ConstitutionalRight: A JurisprudentiallyBased InquiryInto
Criteria and Content, forthcoming.
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a judgment jeopardizes not only our public policies, both foreign
and domestic, but our system of government as well. It can be,
argued that when human rights are violated by a foreign government, subsequent incarceration by the United States in accordance with a prisoner transfer agreement violates the obligation of
the United States under the United Nations Charter to take "joint
and separate action" to insure universal respect for and observance
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.' 6 United Nations
charter obligations clearly prevail over any inconsistent agreements between the United States and Canada or Mexico,' 7 and
fundamental human rights, as obligations erga omnes, would prevail as well."'
One of the reasons why United States courts have refused to
execute a foreign penal judgment in the United States' 9 is the
desire to prevent the subversion of constitutional guarantees for
protection of the civil rights of persons accused of crime. Another
important reason appears to be the determination of the courts to oe ci3
c, foreign courts and the refusal to allow, in effect, the exercise by foreign courts of the powers of the federal judiciary. Such
underlines the importance of the point made above that the United
States government has no constitutional powers to implement
within the United States or abroad the sentences passed by a foreign tribunal utilizing foreign procedures and applying what is
purely a foreign criminal law.
The subversion of United States constitutional guarantees and
the system of constitutionally derived federal powers are the primary reasons why the new prisoner transfer scheme must be opposed and ultimately declared unconstitutional. We have fought
too long and hard for democratic values to allow them to be undermined by agreements with foreign states that are designed to aid
a few hundred United States citizens incarcerated abroad."0 The
16. See U.N. CHARTE, arts. 55(c) and 56; and 1970 Declaration of Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation, U.N.G.A.
Res. 2625 (1970) (state "duty").
17.

See U.N. CHARTER, art. 103.

18. See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, supra note 9, at 26-27, 33-34.
19. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 264; and RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF
LAWs, § 427 (1934), "no state will punish a violation of the criminal law of another
state." The case of Cooley v. Weinberger cited by Bassiouni, supra at n. 24 might
be distinguished or even disapproved by the United States Supreme Court for
reasons stated above.
20. See, e.g., N. LEECH, C. OLIvER, J. SWEENEY, THE NTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 597 (1973).
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authority of our constitutional system is too precious to allow its
ultimate subversion because of a theory that the ends justify the
means. The human rights of United States citizens incarcerated
abroad can also be protected by greater attention by the Executive
and Congress to the protection of human rights abroad, especially
with regard to the minimum rights of all prisoners to due process
and to humai3,post-conviction confinement."' The transfer of prisoner agreements, in effect, forestall the forces of public opinion and
efforts made toward such a transnational implementation.
21. See also 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).

